12th January 2004 | Draft - 2
Is God a Terrorist?
Definitional game-playing by the Coalition of the Willing
- / -
On 11 September 2001 approximately 2800 people were killed by an "Act of
Terrorism". This exploration was produced on the occasion of the death of
an estimated 30,000 people in the earthquake at Bam (Iran, 26 December 2003) --
declared to be an "Act of God".
Introduction
"Acts of God"
"Wrath of God"
"Terrorism"
Combining some threads
Politicization of the definitional process
Towards a generic model of definitional game-playing?
Is God a Terrorist?
Misrepresentation of "God" with respect to risk management
Conceptual gerrymandering
Conclusions
References
Introduction
Concerns about the "Wrath of God" in contrast with "God as Love"
have long been part of the debate in religious circles. Theologians of different
religions have stressed one perspective over the other. The question might be
perceived as relatively distant from the practical realities of an international
community faced with "terrorists".
The following exploration is inspired by the film The
Man Who Sued God (2001) in which a man whose "comprehensively insured"
fishing boat was destroyed by lightning was refused compensation by the insurance
industry because the small print provided for exemptions in the event of such
"Acts of God". The owner then proceeded to bring legal proceedings
against the main religious groups, who all claim to be representatives of God,
in order to be compensated for the destructive consequences of that "Act
of God". The case turned on whether the religious groups believed that
God existed, and whether they effectively represented God and could in consequence
be legitimately sued. The script was written by Don Watson. The film has been
widely reviewed [more
]
The film is a comedy but the core theological, insurance and legal questions
relating to the widely used legal device of an "Act of God" are especially
relevant at a time of the death of 30,000 people in Bam (Iran, 26 December 2003).
Indeed, depending on how exactly "terrorism" is legally defined, there
is a probability that such "Acts of God" may be understood as "Acts
of Terrorism". This would then imply that "God" was a "terrorist"
or should at least be put to the question as having some complicity in "terrorism"
-- according to the procedures envisaged by international conventions against
terrorism, the US Patriot Act, and matching legislation in other member countries
of the Coalition of the Willing. Although "God" cannot be extradited,
there may be a case for extraditing his representatives to Guantanamo Bay!
The following exploration could be considered frivolous and trivial were it
not for the importance attached to "Acts of God" by the insurance
industry (and therefore in contract law), by theologians, and in the light of
the religious dimension introduced both by the devout Christian leadership of
the Coalition of the Willing into the pursuit of the "war against terrorism"
as well as by those yhjery oppose as instigatorgs of that "terrorism".
Christian fundamentalists have identified eight major "Acts of God"
between 1991 and 1999 that are understood to be warnings to the USA by God as
a result of its asking Israel to give up land for peace (see God's
Final Warning to America) [more].
Increasingly the collective response to (and preparation for) "Acts of
God" is allocated far less institutional resources than what are categorized
as "Acts of Terrorism".
Statistics in the USA indicate that 88% of all accidents are caused by unsafe
acts of people, 10% by unsafe conditions, and 2% by "Acts of God"
[more],
although in the case of aircraft accidents it is estimated by the insurance
industry that 38% are due to "Acts of God".
It is interesting that the secular nature of international legal conventions
makes no provision for "Acts of God" [more],
although the United
Nations General Conditions of Contract defines "Force majeure"
to include "Acts of God" -- perhaps the only acknowledgement of God
by the UN?
Others, as noted below, have explored the theme "Is God a Terrorist?".
One of them carefully and amusingly demonstrates that, according to the Old
Testament, God must necessarily be considered a self-confessed terrorist. Related
themes have been humourously explored by The
Onion (notably Lord
Under Investigation For Failure To Provide, 1997; God
Diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, 2001).
"Acts of God"
Some definitions:
- An event which is caused solely by the effect of nature or natural causes
and without any interference by humans whatsoever. Insurance contracts often
exclude "acts of God" from the list of insurable occurrences as a means to
waive their obligations for damage caused by hurricanes, floods or earthquakes,
all examples of "acts of God". (Lawinfo.com)
- As an example, for many years, the various actions of the weather have been
considered an "act of God''. While now it is mainly useful as a classification
label by insurance companies (a subset of the ``bad risk'' classification),
it has its origins in the belief that these weather events were related to
the actions of a God. In the past, the weather was very poorly understood.
It basically followed a seasonal pattern, but sometimes it would do completely
unexpected things. A cyclone, hurricane or tornado would be greatly devastating,
but poorly understood. In a similar category are earthquakes, volcanos and
tidal waves. Because the general definition of a God's power relates to the
things that are not understood, these events were closely associated with
the actions of a God, or of gods....
In recent years, the perception has changed. Things like the weather, earthquakes
and volcanos are better understood. This understanding is perhaps only superficial
in reality as these events still cannot be controlled, and the prediction
is poor. But the understanding is sufficient to have these things seen as
natural events. There is now a scientific viewpoint on them, which separates
it from the supernatural, and ultimately from the association with a god.
With the scientific ideas of complexity, infinite sensitivity and chaos, people
basically now claim to understand it. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that they
know all about it only to the extent that they can classify it into a class
of ``things'' that are too complex to understand. In other words to say that
something is scientifically understood, often only means that it has been
found to be like something else. It can then be classified as a particular
type of system which has a name --- And if it has a name then it is obviously
understood.
The important point here is that with this increase in understanding, however
shallow it is, the elements of the ``supernatural'' class decreases. If the
definition or perception of a god is linked with this supernatural class,
the definition has also been changing. This is particularly important if we
are to consider the visible evidence of the presence of a god. (The
Identity of God)
- In endeavouring to clarify whether the progressive desertification of the
Sahara was an "Act of God", John P. Pratt (The
Sahara: An Act of God? Meridian Magazine, 22 Jan 2001) distinguishes
between two definitions:
- Some dictionaries focus on forces of nature which are uncontrollable
- The other definition focuses on natural events which cannot be foreseen:
"an extraordinary interruption by a natural cause (as a flood or earthquake)
of the usual course of events that experience, prescience, or care cannot
reasonably foresee or prevent.". This he takes to be the common legal definition.
However he finds evidence that predictable events -- and increasingly hurricanes
and earthquakes are predictable to some degree -- are indeed included as
"Acts of God".
Pratt then adds a third perspective, namely "What does God consider
to be an "act of God?" By that I mean a third definition: what does God take
credit for doing? Is the sunrise an act of God?"
- Within the United Nations "Acts of God" are refererenced, without
more definition, in such contexts as the following:
- United Nations
General Conditions of Contract 14.3 Force majeure as used in
this Article means acts of God, war (whether declared or not), invasion,
revolution, insurrection, or other acts of a similar nature or force.
- United Nations
Office for Project Services For purposes of this Order, Force Majeure
is defined as an event beyond the control of the Vendor, not involving
the Vendor's fault or negligence and not foreseeable and includes acts
of God, natural disasters, war (whether or not declared) and other events
of a similar nature or force.
Concerns with how exactly God may act in the light of the combined insight
of theology and science have been usefully summarized by Robert J. Russell (Agential
Models of God’s Interaction With the World, 2000). Agential models deal
explicitly with contemporary science and its philosophical implications to explore
the concept of God as interacting with, but not intervening in, the world. They,
in turn, include three distinct approaches, each of which has been widely developed
in the theology and science literature: top-down causality, whole-part constraints,
and bottom-up causality. However, most scholars insist that a combination of
these approaches will be needed eventually for an adequate account of non-interventionist
divine action.
"Wrath of God"
Some definitions:
- There are many places in the Bible that refer to God’s Wrath. Most times
it is not talking about His emotion alone, but it is referring to a specific
series of events that will happen at an appointed time. The events are God’s
angels killing the wicked people of the world. (The
Wrath of God)
- For Frederick S. Leahy (The
Wrath of God in Relation to the Atonement): If, for example, we do
not believe that God is a God of wrath as well as a God of love, and that
his essential holiness means the inevitable punishment of sin, then we shall
not believe in the substitutionary and vicarious nature of Christ’s death
on the Cross. That is why the doctrine of God’s holy wrath borne by his Son
at Calvary is repugnant to the liberal theologian. He has an erroneous view
of God. The Bible makes it clear that the unforgiven sinner stands under God’s
curse and that ‘the wrath of God abideth (or rests) on him’ (John 3:36).
- W. J. Grier (The Wrath
of God, 1971) points out that one of the evidences of decay and departure
in the professing Church is the large-scale rejection of the teaching of the
Scriptures on the wrath of God and their treatment as representing a perspective
of bygone ages. For Grier, as an introduction to many examples of divine wrath:
"To adopt such views one would have to repudiate a large part of Scripture
from Genesis through to Revelation".
- Mark A. Copeland (The
Epistle to the Romans: The Wrath Of God (1:18-32), 2003) provides
a helpful checklist of why God manifests his wrath and how God manifests his
wrath
- The time of God's wrath is referred to in both the Old and the New Testament.
It is a historic event in which God starts to deal directly with the satanic
forces and the evil people responsible for the destruction of the earth. (Wrath
of God)
Associated with the sense of the "Wrath of God" is the fear that
such potential wrath may engender. Jonathan Gallagher of the Adventist Sabbath
School noted the relatively recent emergence of a new phobia termed theophobia:
The fear of God. Scared of God, terrified of him. Maybe He is out to scare
us! Some views of God indicate just that. In the words of Oscar Wilde the
central theme is “The terror of God, which is the secret of religion.” The
terror of God: a phrase which neatly summarizes the idea that the reason for
and the importance of religion is this overwhelming and petrifying fear of
God—of what he is, and of what he might do. All too often—at different times,
and in different places—it seems Wilde was right. The essence of religious
observance is fear. God is a divine scarecrow, we are the birds! For the moment
it’s enough to think of all the cruelty and terror used in God’s name. At
the heart of all these techniques—whether they are called “evangelism,” “reconversion”
and “encouragement in the faith”—is the same blunderbuss idea. This view says
that violence and force are certainly acceptable to God, for they are only
means to bring about something “good”. Just like God, you can use terrifying
threats and actual killing if it suits your purpose. Scaring people to God.
Is this the way? Does God approve? Is God a terrorist? [more]
"Terrorism"
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Definitions
of Terrorism) notes that:
The question of a definition of terrorism has haunted the debate among states
for decades. A first attempt to arrive at an internationally acceptable definition
was made under the League of Nations, but the convention drafted in 1937 never
came into existence. The UN Member States still have no agreed-upon definition.
Terminology consensus would, however, be necessary for a single comprehensive
convention on terrorism, which some countries favour in place of the present
12 piecemeal conventions and protocols. The lack of agreement on a definition
of terrorism has been a major obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures.
Cynics have often commented that one state's "terrorist" is another state's
"freedom fighter". If terrorism is defined strictly in terms of attacks on
non-military targets, a number of attacks on military installations and soldiers'
residences could not be included in the statistics.
A recent book discussing attempts by the UN and other international bodies
to define terrorism runs to three volumes and 1,866 pages without reaching any
firm conclusion. The UN body identifies the following international approaches
to such a definition:
- League of Nations Convention (1937): "All criminal acts directed against
a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds
of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public".
- UN Resolution language (1999): "1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods
and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by
whomsoever committed; 2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated
to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable,
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial,
ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them". (GA
Res. 51/210 Measures to eliminate international terrorism)
- Short legal definition proposed by A. P. Schmid to United Nations Crime
Branch (1992): Act of Terrorism = Peacetime Equivalent of War Crime
- Academic Consensus Definition: "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method
of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group
or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby
- in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-
and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization),
(imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target
(audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or
a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda
is primarily sought" (Schmid, 1988).
As pointed out by Michael Jordan (Terrorism's
Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats, Christian Science Monitor,
3 February 2002):
There are already 12 different terrorism "conventions," or treaties, on the
books - created piecemeal over the past few decades. They criminalize activities
such as airplane hijacking, hostage-taking, nuclear terrorism, and assorted
bombings. In addition, the UN Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism
Committee shortly after Sept. 11 to force member-states to harmonize antiterrorism
laws, in areas such as financing. Since then, more and more countries have
ratified the treaties. Still, some countries, some actions, slip through the
cracks, observers say.
Some other definitions:
- For the US Department of State (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001): No
one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes
of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained
in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains
the following definitions: The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant (1) targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The
term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory
of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing,
or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.
- For the US Department of Defense: The calculated use of violence or the
threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political,
religious, or ideological.
- As defined by the FBI, "the unlawful use of force against persons or property
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment
thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives". This definition
includes three elements: (1) Terrorist activities are illegal and involve
the use of force. (2) The actions are intended to intimidate or coerce. (3)
The actions are committed in support of political or social objectives. (FEMA-SS)
- Use of terror, especially the systematic use of terror by the government
or other authority against particular persons or groups; a method of opposing
a government internally or externally through the use of terror [more]
- Any act including, but not limited to, the use of force or violence and/or
threat thereof of any person or group(s) of persons whether acting alone or
on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation(s) or government(s)
committed for political, religions, ideological or similar purposes, including
the intention to influence any government and/or to put the public or any
section of the public in fear. (European
Council of International Schools 2003)
- Acts of murder and destruction deliberately directed against civilians or
military in non-military situations. (Jewish
Agency for Israel)
- Act of terrorism, terrorist act -- (the calculated use of violence (or threat
of violence) against civilians in order to attain goals that are political
or religious or ideological in nature; this is done through intimidation or
coercion or instilling fear) (WordNet)
- The act of terrorizing, or state of being terrorized; a mode of government
by terror or intimidation. --Jefferson. (Hyperdictionary)
In response to the confusion regarding the definition of terrorism, the Rational
Radical (October 2001) suggested the following clarification in determining
whether an act is "terrorism" or not. In this view it would be more useful to
eliminate subjective evaluations of the goals of the violence, and instead,
utilize two other factors -- the expected result of the violence, and the nature
of the actor -- to then distinguish among four different types of acts involving
the application of force:
- Expected result of the violence: Let's define an action as "terrorism" if
the use of violence would reasonably be expected to harm innocent civilians.
This is to be distinguished from a "military" action, where the use of violence
is not reasonably expected to harm innocent civilians.
- Nature of the actor: A "state" action would be one conducted by a sovereign
government. A "guerrilla" action will be one conducted by a non-governmental
entity.
- Four different types of violent acts: Hence, we can have both state military
actions and state terrorism actions. Likewise, there can be both guerrilla
military actions and guerrilla terrorism actions.
The key act through which terrorism is now defined to legitimate US government
response against terrorism is the Patriot Act (31 October 2001):
- New definitions of terrorism expand scope of surveillance. One new definition
of terrorism and three expansions of previous definitions also expand the
scope of surveillance. PATRIOT §802's definition of "domestic terrorism" (amending
18 USC §2331) raises concerns about legitimate protest activity being prosecuted
as terrorism, especially if violence erupts, while additions to three existing
definitions of terrorism (int'l terrorism per 18 USC §2331, terrorism transcending
national borders per 18 USC §2332b, and federal terrorism per amended 18 USC
§2332b(g)(5)(B)) expose more people to surveillance (and potential "harboring"
and "material support" liability, §§803, 805). [more]
Carroll E. Payne Jr (founder of the World
Conflict Quarterly) argues that: According to these definitions the
"Boston Tea Party" was a terrorist act and the British troops had every right
to fire at the "Boston Massacre". Until a working definition is agreed to internationally,
the problem of state sponsored terrorism and Terrorist vs. Freedom Fighter will
not be resolved. Once nations can agree on who is a terrorist and what is terrorism
then the extradition of people accused of terrorism between nations can proceed.
A clearly stated, internationally accepted, definition of terrorists and terrorism
will ultimately result in the reduction of tensions between nations in solving
international crises.
The problem has become especially acute for the insurance industry. As terrorism
coverage continues to be excluded from more and more property and casualty policies,
insurance industry leaders are advocating a global definition of terrorism.
(Insurers
Push for Global Terrorism Definition, Insurance Journal, 25 July
2002)
One of the most problematic aspects of achieving any definition is clarifying
the relationship between terrorism and any form of struggle for liberation.
In this respect the analysis of Boaz Ganor (Defining
Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?) is
especially helpful (see below).
Combining some threads
The United Methodist Women have responded in part to some of the challenges
of the above (Terrorism:
a problem of definition) arguing that:
From the Roman point of view, the bandits who were hanged on either side
of Jesus at the cross may have been "terrorists." However, they may have been
"freedom fighters" from the point of view of the occupied, colonized zealous
members of Palestine of Jesus' day. The word "terrorism" is fraught with complexities.
There is a problem of definition. Therefore, one needs to make a distinction
between the doer and the deed.
A helpful way of naming the doer and the deed is suggested by Peter C. Sederberg
in his book, Terrorist Myths, Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality. He urges
his readers not to confuse the actor (terrorist), the action (terrorism),
and the effect (terror). He says, "...the inclination to equate sin with sinner
(or terrorism with terrorist) may be an inevitable shorthand in everyday relations,
but it impairs analysis. Once we apply such a label, that is all we tend to
see" .
They also stress:
Further, terrorism is not a God-sent act. Terrorism is a human-designed,
human-executed act. In Jesus' days, when anxious people asked why the Tower
of Siloam accidentally fell and killed many people, Jesus said that it was
a calamity, and the people who were killed in the tragedy were not worse sinners
than others who lived in Jerusalem (Luke 13:4). Let us not confuse human acts
with God's acts in times such as this.
For Rev. Garry Dombrosky, Campus Chaplain and Assistant Professor of Applied
Religion of University College of Alberta Concordia. "This was not an act of
God but an act of evil. It is the same evil that came upon Christ. It is the
same evil which God triumphed over in the victory of Jesus Christ." [more]
For Pastor Don Schneider, president of the Adventist Church's North American
Division:
"Some people say this is an act of God; they're wrong. When an Adventist
Disaster Response worker helps someone hurt by these tragedies, that's an
act of God. When people of all faiths get together and pray for the victims
and their families and co-workers, that's an act of God. But when people create
chaos and havoc and destruction, that's not even the act of people who believe
in God. God's getting blamed today for causing the disaster, and He didn't
have anything to do with it." [more]
Michael Wong (Terrorism
in the Bible, 2001) asks the question: "What is terrorism, if not
the events of Exodus?" He then proceeds to provide a useful comparison
in parallel columns of Osama Bin Laden with Moses, both of whom claimed divine
inspiration and assistance in their campaigns of terror. He then suggests that
Moses -- as "one of the first arch-terrorists in recorded history"
-- was Osama Bin-Laden's role model:
Both had legitimate grievances to air, and both thought that the proper way
to air those grievances was by visiting pain, hardship, and death upon innocent
civilians. Both thought that God was on their side (the same God!), both spared
some of their hatred for any of their own people who step out of line, and
both stepped away from privileged lives of wealth and power in order to do
so. So what's the moral of this story? The next time someone rhetorically
asks about the source of Osama Bin Laden's evil, point him to the Bible. If
fundamentalists believe in a God who is capable of terrorism, we should hardly
be surprised when they deal with their problems by resorting to terrorism
themselves! Indeed, we should count ourselves lucky that Christian fundamentalists
have few real problems to complain about (hence their whining about non-issues
such as their desire to turn public schools into Sunday schools), or we could
be facing a lot more domestic terrorism, even worse than the usual abortion
clinic bombings and shootings.
In Australia, the Department of Veterans Affairs has now indicated that the
Defence Service Homes Insurance now contains a "terrorism exclusion endorsement".
This excludes any cover for "death, injury, illness, loss, damage, liability,
cost or expense directly or indirectly arising out of or in connection with
any act of terrorism". Terrorism is defined as anything designed to influence
the government of any nation or any act in pursuit of "political, religious,
ideological or similar purposes" designed to intimidate the public, and carried
out by anyone, either acting alone or as a group. And in case ex-soldier home
owners decide to defend themselves against an act of terrorism, forget that
too. The exclusion means there will be no cover for any injury or loss "resulting
from, or arising out of or in connection with any action in controlling, preventing,
suppressing, retaliating against, or responding to any act of terrorism". From
this it may be concluded that terrorism has been declared by Australian government
insurers to be equal to an Act of God.
On USA national television, Christian leaders, such as Jerry Falwell (who asserted
that Muhammad was
a terrorist), have said outright that the act of terrorism of 9/11 was due
to God visiting His judgment upon an apostate America -- God's judgment against
feminism, homosexuality, and abortion. Or they have said that He “allowed” it
because He has some kind of grand plan that somehow includes the vicious murder
of thousands of innocent people. Islamic militants, meanwhile, rejoice that
Allah has blessed their efforts to bring down the “infidels.” Thus a choir of
religious voices call the events of September 11 “an act of God.” [more]
For Doris Drisgil (The
Ultimate Terrorist):
Natural disasters have long been termed, "acts of god." To a rationalist,
this phrase holds the strongest irony. Have all the earthquakes and floods
that have killed thousands of people over millennia been willful acts of an
intelligent, omnipotent god? If that is true, this supernatural being who
has us in his power is the worst terrorist ever imagined. If he has the ability
to regulate natural events, and chooses to cause disasters that result in
undeserved pain and death, then how can anyone consider him good? Many believers
will say that natural disasters can't be blamed on god. Are they admitting
that their god doesn't have full control over everything that happens? Certainly
a less-than-all-powerful deity would be more believable than the omnipotent
but cruel god of traditional beliefs. Yet nearly all monotheists insist that
their god is omnipotent, and we just don't understand this reasons for doing
what he does.
For the EternityNow Ministries (Is
God a Terrorist?, 2001): "God is not a terrorist, and recent events
are not the result of his displeasure and his judgment".
Hope is deferred and the heart is made sick when we don’t believe God accepts,
loves and affirms us. The way you believe God sees you will shape how you
see Him, how you see yourself, and will dominate the landscape of your Christian
experience. Now, more than ever, American Christians need to see the love
of God is real, vital and abundantly available. You have reeled in shock as
you witnessed the horrors of war on your own soil. You have tackled the mind-numbing
questions of "Why?" or "How could a thing like this happen?" and "What happens
next?"
John Norman (An
Effective and Reasonable Next Step in the War on Terrorism, 27 January
2002) takes as his point of departure the statements of Exodus (chapters
10, 11 and 12) in a careful analysis of George Bush's declaration that you cannot
differentiate between terrorists, and also that anyone providing financial support
to terrorists should be regarded as a terrorist as well:
Terrorism can be defined as the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians
in order to coerce a given society and their leaders to change their political
stand on given issues. The earliest recorded historical incidence of terrorism
is found in sacred texts, and regards a certain Middle Eastern society who
had been kept as slaves for various generations in a neighboring country.
The leader of that other country was asked to let those people go, but he
was stubborn and wouldn’t do it. So, in order to coerce his decision a supernatural
being by the name of Jehovah unleashed a series of calamities on that leader’s
nation. There were ten of these calamities, and the first nine cannot be characterized
as outright terrorism, since they involve what might be called natural disasters.
The tenth of these calamities, however, is different: ...."About midnight
will I go out into the midst of Egypt: And all the firstborn in the land of
Egypt shall die, from the first born of Pharaoh that sitteth upon his throne,
even unto the firstborn of the maidservant that is behind the mill; and all
the firstborn of beasts…"
Now it has been argued that these were not innocent people, since all Egyptians
shared in the guilt of this enslavement. But if we accept that, then we are
bound to give credence to the extreme view that there are no innocent Israelis,
Americans, etc., thus making them fair targets.
As argued by Charles Love of St. Andrew's United Church (Is
God a Terrorist?): "A simplistic, literal reading of this story
permissively opens the door to any imaginable act of aggression that we might
hurl at any perceived enemy: God showed us in Egypt how to deal with them. Haul
out the Old Testament and bombs away". Although God is acclaimed to be
the epitome of Good, John Norman summarizes his argument that you cannot let
any terrorist off the hook by referring to how nice a person he is outside of
his terrorist activities. Given his point of departure, he concludes (whether
humorously or not):
Now, since you cannot differentiate among terrorists, and since anyone who
knowingly gives financial support to a terrorist should be considered as a
terrorist, then the first step I propose is for Bush to order Ashcroft to
close down every church in the United States where people worship this god,
and, since the members support this god through their donations, to declare
them to be supporters of a terrorist.
Some of the above points raise the question as to whether the actions of George
Bush and Tony Blair -- profoundly held by them to be in conformity with God's
Will -- are to be considered "Acts of God". In acting on behalf of God,
to what extent are they to be considered agents of God? It was precisely this
kind of thinking that was rejected by the USA before the UN General Assembly with
respect to 9/11: "The representative of the United States said the barbarities
of 11 September had been acts of war perpetrated by men who had perverted the
basic elements of civilized life and had dared to call their deeds acts of God.
The terrorists could not deceive the world by attempting to wrap themselves in
Islam's glorious mantle." [more]
Politicization of the definitional process
The many examples above point to the core difficulty of any effort at definition
and clarification, namely that every such effort is bedevilled by claims and
counterclaims -- and especially about the quality of evidence and the legal
context within which proof of any assertions is presented. This is exemplified
by the common statement that "One man's terrorist is another man"s
freedom fighter".
As noted by Boaz Ganor (Defining
Terrorism: is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter?) in
an excellent analysis (which is itself subject to this problem): "However,
when dealing with terrorism and guerrilla warfare, implications of defining
our terms tend to transcend the boundaries of theoretical discussions".
It is the politicization of analysis that cautions against optimistic expectations
that definition is fundamental to "the attempt to coordinate international
collaboration, based on the currently accepted rules of traditional warfare"
(in Ganor's terms). Any "objectivity" may indeed be simply a way of
framing "terrorism" to the advantage of particular agendas whilst
ignoring or marginalizing its implications for others. Ganor himself is in a
difficult position in this respect as Director of the International
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (Israel) given the ambiguities of
Israel's perceived role in relation to terrorism.
Ganor takes as his point of departure the 109 definitions of terrorism identified
by Alex P Schmidt and Albert J Youngman (Political Terrorism, 1988) in
a survey of academics in the field. From this he concludes:
The prevalent definitions of terrorism entail difficulties, both conceptual
and syntactical. It is thus not surprising that alternative concepts with
more positive connotations—guerrilla movements, underground movements, national
liberation movements, commandos, etc.—are often used to describe and characterize
the activities of terrorist organizations. Generally these concepts are used
without undue attention to the implications, but at times the use of these
definitions is tendentious, grounded in a particular political viewpoint.
By resorting to such tendentious definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations
and their supporters seek to gloss over the realities of terrorism, thus establishing
their activities on more positive and legitimate foundations.
Ganor then explores the following themes:
- Terrorism
or Revolutionary Violence? He questions the conclusion, in this respect,
that a political motive makes revolutionary activity acceptable and that the
end justifies the means.
- Terrorism
or National Liberation? He concludes that: "The claim that a freedom
fighter cannot be involved in terrorism, murder and indiscriminate killing
is, of course, groundless. A terrorist organization can also be a movement
of national liberation, and the concepts of 'terrorist' and 'freedom fighter'
are not mutually contradictory." He argues that efforts to present them
as distinct: "strengthens the attempt by terrorist organizations to present
terrorism and the struggle for liberation as two contradictory concepts. It
thus plays into the terrorists’ hands by supporting their claim that, since
they are struggling to remove someone they consider a foreign occupier, they
cannot be considered terrorists."
- Targeting “the
innocent”? As noted above, causing harm to the "innocent", "innocent
civilians" or "civilians" figures in some definitions of terrorism,
notably in the emotive arguments of religious groups. Ganor argues that: "Politicians
in countries affected by terrorism at times make political use of the definition
of terrorism by attempting to emphasize its brutality. One of the prevalent
ways of illustrating the cruelty and inhumanity of terrorists is to present
them as harming 'the innocent.'". But for him: "'Innocent' (as opposed
to 'civilian') is a subjective concept, influenced by the definer’s viewpoint,
and therefore must not be the basis for a definition of terrorism. The use
of the concept 'innocent' in defining terrorism makes the definition meaningless
and turns it into a tool in the political game."
- Proposing a
Definition of Terrorism In the light of the above concerns, he proposes
the definition: "terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use
violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain
political aims". With respect to "civilians", he notes: "Terrorism
is thus distinguished from other types of political violence (guerrilla warfare,
civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of
the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous anxiety, and the intense media reaction
evoked by attacks against civilian targets. The proposed definition emphasizes
that terrorism is not the result of an accidental injury inflicted on a civilian
or a group of civilians who stumbled into an area of violent political activity,
but stresses that this is an act purposely directed against civilians. Hence,
the term “terrorism” should not be ascribed to collateral damage to civilians
used as human shields or to cover military activity or installations, if such
damage is incurred in an attack originally aimed against a military target.
In this case, the responsibility for civilian casualties is incumbent upon
whoever used them as shields."
- Guerrilla Warfare
vs. Terrorism Ganor addresses the ambiguities of this distinction: "Terrorism
and guerrilla warfare often serve as alternative designations of the same
phenomenon. The term “terrorism,” however, has a far more negative connotation,
seemingly requiring one to take a stand, whereas the term “guerrilla warfare”
is perceived as neutral and carries a more positive connotation". However:
"The proposed definition, as noted, distinguishes terrorism from guerrilla
activity according to the intended target of attack. The definition states
that if an attack deliberately targets civilians, then that attack will be
considered a terrorist attack, whereas, if it targets military or security
personnel then it will be considered a guerrilla attack. It all depends on
who the intended victims are." Ganor also allows for the possibility
that: "A situation is certainly possible in which an organization might
decide to move from the stage of terrorism to the stage of guerrilla warfare,
and vice-versa, thereby changing its character from one involved only in,
or mainly in, terrorism, to one involved mainly in guerrilla warfare".
- Individual
Terrorism and Urban Guerrilla Warfare Ganor stresses that this area of
potential ambiguity is addressed by the identity of the intended target. "An
attack against military personnel, or against a leading decision-maker who
formulates policy (including counter-terrorist policy), could be considered,
according to the proposed definition, an 'urban guerrilla' activity. However,
if the target is a civilian not acting in a decision-making capacity, but
merely someone who is at most a political or social symbol (a well known singer,
a journalist, a past leader, a judge, the head of a community or ethnic group,
etc.), this will be an act of 'individual terrorism' according to the proposed
definition."
- The Aims of Terrorism
and of Guerrilla Warfare He argues that "the type of goal sought
is irrelevant (so long as the goal is political). The terrorist and the guerrilla
fighter may have the exact same aims, but they choose different means to accomplish
them." He concludes: It may be difficult at times to determine whether
the victim of an attack was indeed a civilian, or whether the attack was intentional.
These cases could be placed under the rubric of a “gray area,” to be decided
in line with the evidence and through the exercise of judicial discretion.
The proposed definition may therefore be useful in the legal realm as a criterion
for defining and categorizing the perpetrators’ activities. In any event,
adopting the proposed definition of terrorism will considerably reduce the
“gray area” to a few marginal cases."
- Defining States’
Involvement in Terrorism Ganor argues that: "States can be involved
in terrorism in various ways: from various levels of general support for terrorist
organizations, through operational assistance, initiating or directing attacks,
and up to the perpetration of terrorist attacks by official state agencies.
All forms of state involvement in terrorism are usually placed under the general
category of 'terrorist states,' or 'state sponsored terrorism.' Such a designation
has taken on the character of a political weapon; rival states ascribe it
to one another, and terrorist organizations use it against states acting against
them....Various countries have engaged in attacks against leading activists
of terrorist organizations—planners and initiators of attacks, commanders
of operational units, saboteurs and even the organizations’ leaders. On such
grounds, these countries have often been accused of engaging in terrorism
themselves."
But for Ganor: "According to the proposed definition of terrorism...
actions by a state against terrorist activists cannot be defined as 'terrorism,'
even if only because the latter are not actually civilians. Individuals engaging
in terrorist activities, even if not wearing a uniform, exclude themselves
from the civilian community, and rules protecting civilians no longer apply
to them. Thus, just as the definition views decision-makers as 'legitimate'
targets in guerrilla warfare, so targeting terrorists who head operational,
administrative or political branches in a terrorist organization should not
itself be considered a terrorist activity, since these are the people responsible
for policy formulation and decision making in the organization." In this
connection, Ganor explicitly sets aside "questions bearing on the legitimate
confines of a struggle against terrorism and on the rights of states to fight
terrorists in the territory of another sovereign state".
- The Importance
of Defining Terrorism Ganor provides a valuable summary of the needs for
an adequate definition. However he fails to address in any way the basic question
of how evidence is to be acquired or presented before competent legal authorities
in support of any charge of terrorism. This has proven to be a significant
issue in relation to "targeted killings" where it is sufficient
for the military authority to claim that they possessed such evidence and
acted on it (as judge, jury and executioner) -- whether or not evidence to
the contrary might have been available had the "accused" been alive
to present it.
- The Attitude
of Terrorist Organizations Toward the Definition For Ganor: "The
international adoption of the proposed definition, with its distinction between
terrorism and guerrilla warfare -- and its concomitant separation from political
aims -- could motivate the perpetrators to reconsider their intentions, choosing
military targets over civilian targets -- guerrilla warfare over terrorism–both
because of moral considerations and because of 'cost-benefit' considerations."
Ganor summarizes the thrust of his argument as follows: "The struggle
to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself.
The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree
on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the
'politically correct' one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate
that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible
goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition.
The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better. "
Several questions must be asked however:
- to what extent definitions of terrorism are developed (by bodies of whatever
political persuasion) to protect (and "whitewash") the agendas of
those that promote them?
- given the problematic, and highly secretive, approach to evidence of terrorism,
does not any definition leave itself open to abuse (as in the case of "targeted
killings") by "terrorists", or by those that oppose them (especially
when the relationship to due legal process is treated in such cases under
clauses of exception)?
- given the subtlety of some distinctions, especially under operational conditions,
to what extent does the problematic ability to collect and present evidence,
and to assert and prove its validity, not completely undermine aspirations
for an "objective" consideration of "terrorism"?
- to what extent the process of defining terrorism is itself politicized (as
with that of "aggression") and subject to efforts to define the
space in which such definition should be agreed, to dominate the debate within
that space, to be able subsequently to claim "universal" consensus
of responsible parties in reaching consensus?
Despite the excellence of his analysis, however, the value of Ganor's work
is diminished by his failure to use his scheme to confront, as a striking example,
the evidence (presented by some) for "terrorism" by the Irgun and
Haganah prior to the emergence of the State of Israel. It is such omissions
which similarly undermine efforts to clarify the definition of "terrorism"
within the USA by failing to distinguish when the USA may itself have engaged
in, or supported, "terrorist activities" (as claimed by some) in a
manner currently considered reprehensible by George Bush.
In the case of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) how is
the King David Hotel bombing on 26 July 1946, commanded by Menachem Begin (subsequently
Prime Minister of Israel) and resulting in the death of 91 people, to be assessed
in the light of Ganor's definition? The extent to which Irgun was terrorist
or not has been explored elsewhere (see for example Jean Shaoul. Terrorism
and the origins of Israel, 2003; J. Bowyer Bell. Terror Out of Zion:
The Fight for Israeli Independence, 1996; Nader Khaireddine Abuljebai. The
Different Types of Israeli and Zionist Terrorism ), notably pointing
to the inappropriateness of seeking to establish any moral equivalence between
the activities of Irgun and PLO activitists [more
| more
| more].
It would appear to be the case that no international definition of "terrorism"
can be agreed without recognizing the extent to which many of those parties
to such a definition may themselves have been engaged in "terrorist activities",
whether exceptionally, inadvertently or systematically -- or legitimately (if
erroneously) perceived to have been so engaged. this suggsts an international
equivalent to South Africa's innovative Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.
It is such questions which justify the further exploration of the theme "Is
God a Terrorist" -- especially given the strong possibility that the process
of defining terrorism is driven in part by the needs of the insurance industry
to avoid exposure to risk, and by other parties to avoid confronting their own
historical realities and tendencies.
Towards a generic model of definitional game-playing?
This section draws attention to a number of areas of decades-long controversial
debate over matters of definition. The familiarity with some of these areas
may prove helpful in providing a larger context through which to explore the
newer process of definition of "terrorism" -- and the relevance of
the question "Is God a terrorist?"
Aggression: The process of international debate regarding the definition
of aggression provides a classic case for reflection on the nature of such definitional
processes. Efforts towards such a definition were initiated under the League
of Nations in 1933. They were relaunched under the United Nations in 1950 with
no conclusion. A further effort was started in 1967 and continued for seven
years with the adoption (without a vote) of a consensus definition in 1974.
Member states were by no means agreed upon its meaning. (see Benjamin B. Ferencz.
The United Nations Consensus
Definition Of Aggression: Sieve Or Substance, 1995) [more].
A number of issues were avoided to achieve consensus [more].
This definition is of course focused on that relating to states. It does not
address wider understandings of aggression amongst ethnic groups and in interpersonal
relationships [more].
Given that "terrorism" could be considered a subcategory of "aggression",
it is clear that consensus was achieved at the cost of excluding a variety of
important dimensions. It notably failed to provide adequately for the activities
of the Coalition of the Willing in invading Iraq.
Slavery: Recognition of "slavery" as unacceptable has taken
centuries. Slavery nevertheless exists today despite the fact that it is banned
in most of the countries where it is practiced [more].
It is also prohibited by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the 1956 UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. Current forms include:
bonded labour, forced labour, child labour, commercial sexual exploitation of
children, traffiicking, early and forced marriage, traditional or 'chattel'
slavery. Of special interest here is the degree of involvement of governments
of the time in the slave trade, given its importance to their economies. Such
governments of course include those of many of the industrialized countries
of today. Also of particular interest is the controversial nature of the debate
for abolition of slavery in such countries notably in the USA -- where the debate
was not resolved rationally but through the American
Civil War, 1961-65 of which it was a principal cause. The persistent forms
of slavery, possibly with the complicity of the countries that have explicitly
banned it, illustrates the ambiguities associated with the definitional problem.
Indigenous peoples: Recognition of indigenous peoples and the consequences
of the marginalization to which they have been exposed over centuries, both
in law and in society, has been slow in coming. The early decades of the last
century saw them subject to the whims of state-sanctioned bounty hunters --
seeking their elimination in some countries. By being effectively defined as
"subhuman" there were few constraints on their slaughter -- a mindset
that saw its peak in the Nazi approach to the ethnic groups that they sought
to exterminate. The operation of death squads to eliminate such peoples continues
in parts of Latin America. The process of defining groups as outside society
is echoed by Ganor's comment above that: "Individuals engaging in terrorist
activities, even if not wearing a uniform, exclude themselves from the civilian
community, and rules protecting civilians no longer apply to them". The
definitional challenges relating to indigenous peoples persist in connection
with land rights issues for which treaties may well have been signed in the
past.
Communism / Socialism / Capitalism: The definition and handling of "dissidence",
notably in relation to national security, has been intensively explored throughout
the Cold War period and before. Under Communism it gave rise to notorious legal
processes and executions in an effort to identify and remove those that were
not acting according to the party line. In the USA, the process of the controversial
hearings in the 1950s conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy's Senate Committee
on Government Operations, and those conducted by the House
Unamerican Activities Committee (HUAC), are of interest because of their
efforts to define threats to American society through "Communism"
and "Socialism". Comparisons with the treatment of those suspected
of terrorism have already been made.
Collaboration in time of war: During, or following, major wars, a number
of countries have had to explore the boundaries of any definition of "collaboration
with the enemy". Given George Bush's definition of support for terrorism,
this is an especially controversial matter at a time when newly-declassified
documents in the US National Archives and Library of Congress are indicating
the level of involvement of the family of George Bush in support of the Nazi
war machine. According to John Buchanan (Bush
- Nazi Link Confirmed, New Hampshire Gazette, 2003) the documents
indicate that Prescott Bush, the grandfather of President George W. Bush, served
as a business partner of and U.S. banking operative for the financial architect
of the Nazi war machine from 1926 until 1942, when Congress took aggressive
action against Bush and his "enemy national" partners, notably seizing assets
on 20 October 1942, under authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act. (see
also John Buchanan and Stacey Michael. Bush
- Nazi Dealings Continued Until 1951 : Federal Documents. New Hampshire
Gazette, November 2003) [more
| more |
more]. Of special interest in
this case is the level of denial relating to the topic over 60 years by the
media which only in October 2003 is finally exploring the matter [more].
"Civil society" and "NGO": The definitional game-playing
in connection with the progressive recognition of "civil society"
organizations in contrast to "NGOs" has been explored elsewhere (Interacting
Fruitfully with Un-Civil Society the dilemma for non-civil society organizations.
1996). this has been evident both within the context of the UN system (originator
of the term NGO) and in the academic community. Of special relevance here is
the challenge of defining "terrorist organization" in relation to
other non-governmental bodies, including liberation movements. Of particular
interest is the difference in attitude in different cultures with different
styles and traditions of organization.
Substance abuse: There has been considerable media coverage of the different
aspects of substance abuse and the collective response to it. In the USA this
was first marked by the Prohibition
era (1919-1933) when the manufacture, purchase, transportation, import, export,
and sale of alcoholic beverages was prohibited. This was possible because of
the manner in which alcohol was successfully defined as "evil" to
the electorate. More recent periods have seen efforts around the world to restrict
access to narcotic drugs through various "wars on drugs". But in both
cases the definitional problems may be seen in the quite different attitudes
and policies adopted around the world -- in the light of what is perceived by
some to be the extremely irresponsible liberalism of the Netherlands. The use
of tobacco products provides another classic example. All these cases illustrate
the difficulty for governments, previously illustrated by the slave trade, of
depriving themselves of a major source of revenue. The direct involvement of
governments in the opium trade resulted in the so-called Opium
Wars (1839-42, 1856-60) in China. The complicity of governments in the international
drug trade is a continuing feature of the "war on drugs"
Coalition of the Willing: This coalition was claimed by George Bush
in March 2003 to number 49 states [more].
The interesting definitional challenge is the circumstances under which individual
countries work within the Coalition on a particular issue, or fail to do so
for whatever reason. The integrity of the Coalition can best be defined by that
much-favoured European institutional expression of "variable geometry".
It would be more appropriate to present the "hidden" structure of
the Coalition of the Willing as a table indicating which countries were involved
on which issues and which were actively opposed on which issues. Methodologically
this points to the merit of a "variable geometry" definition of both
"God" and "terrorist".
"Sexual abuse" and "Terrorism": The nature of the
definitional process, and the abuses to which it can lend itself, is worth exploring
in the light of "sexual
abuse", notably of children within the context of religious institutions
(as has been made evident in legal cases in recent years regarding abuses from
earlier decades). For example, one source asserts: "By far the most pervasive
form of terrorism is sexual in nature" (Sexual
Terrorism). It is the widespread nature of the phenomenon (and hence
the greater familiarity with its implications), and the fact that it seldom
results in physical death, that permits the controversial aspects of the definitional
process to be explored as the basis for a generic model of definition in emotional
charged contexts.
|
Political terrorism
|
Sexual terrorism
|
| Terror experienced by victims of "Acts of Terrorism",
whether through direct exposure or the threat thereof |
Terror experienced by victims, whether through direct exposure
or the threat thereof |
| Intentional use of threat |
Intentional use of threat |
| Civilians ("innocent civilians") |
Vulnerable ("innocent women and children") |
| "Military personnel" as legitimate targets (but
of of guerilla warfare) |
"Victims" framed as soliciting such activity ("professionally"),
or habituated to it, in a process of legitimate "sexual warfare"
|
| Acceptability of a declared "political" motive of
"liberation" as part of a revolutionary political process |
Acceptability of a declared "educational" motive
of "liberation" as part of a process of sexual revolution |
| State-supported (or tolerated) terrorism |
State-supported (or tolerated) sexual exploitation (R&R
and "comfort women) |
| Institution-supported terrorism (characterized by provision
of funds, shelter and resources) |
Institution-supported sexual terrorism (characterized by cover-up
and failure to discipline perpetrators, in addition to provision of a sheltered
institutional framework) |
| Concealment of evidence (or its destruction) and intimidation
of potential witnesses |
Concealment of evidence (or its destruction) and intimidation
of potential witnesses |
| "Interrogation" of perpetrators without adequate
legal protection |
"Interrogation" of perpetrators, often without adequate
legal protection |
| Accusation/condemnation by "victims" without effective
appeal (as with cases of "targeted killings") |
Accusation/conviction on the basis of evidence from "victims"
without effective appeal (as with cases of False
Memory Syndrome) |
| Denial of evidence and repudiation of witnesses (incl. assassination
of witnesses) |
Denial of evidence and repudiation of witnesses (incl. character
assassination) |
| Secrecy: covert implementation |
Secrecy: covert implementation |
| Sanction of moral authority: selective presentation of religious
citations |
Sanction of moral authority: whether parental, institutional
or religious (in the case of abuse in religious institutions) |
| Exceptionalism: pattern of abuse framed as isolated "mistakes"
arising from regrettable actions of a particular individual not respecting
institutional policy |
Exceptionalism: pattern of abuse framed as isolated "mistakes"
arising from regrettable actions of a particular individual not respecting
institutional policy |
| "Trial" by media and public opinion in advance of
(and undermining) any due process |
"Trial" by media and public opinion in advance of
(and undermining) any due process |
| Manipulation of definition of political terrorism to exclude
(or include) certain forms |
Manipulation of definition of sexual terrorism to exclude
(or include) certain forms according to circumstances |
| |
|
Is God a Terrorist?
Proceeding on the assumption that there is a generic model of controversial
definitional problems, characterized by a high degree of definitional game-playing,
the framework elaborated above in the comparison of political vs sexual terrorism
may then be tentatively applied below to a comparison of "Acts of Terrorism"
vs "Acts of God".
|
"Acts of Terrorism"
Political terrorism
|
"Acts of God"
"God as terrorist"
|
| Terror experienced by victims of "Acts of Terrorism",
whether through direct exposure or the threat thereof |
Terror experienced by victims of "Acts of God",
whether through direct exposure or the threat thereof |
| Intentional use of threat |
Intentional use of threat (eg Wrath of God; Hell) |
| Victims: Civilians ("innocent civilians") |
Victims: "Innocents" (eg "first born"
of Egypt) |
| "Military personnel" as legitimate targets
(but of of guerilla warfare) |
"Evil" people as evoking such a response
in the legitimate warfare between "Good and Evil" |
| Acceptability of a declared "political" motive of
"liberation" as part of a revolutionary political process |
Acceptability of a declared "political " motive
(eg liberating the Jews from Egyptian slavery) |
| State-supported (or tolerated) terrorism |
Hierarchically-accepted terrorism |
| Institution-supported terrorism (characterized
by provision of funds, shelter and resources) |
Terrorism supported by religious institutions
representative of God |
| Concealment of evidence (or its destruction) and intimidation
of potential witnesses |
Concealment of evidence for alternative explanations (or its
destruction) and intimidation of potential witnesses by religious institutions
representative of God |
| "Interrogation" of perpetrators without
adequate legal protection |
"Interrogation" of those framed as instigators,
by religious institutions representative of God, often without adequate
legal protection |
| Accusation/condemnation by "victims" without effective
appeal (as with cases of "targeted killings") |
Accusation/conviction on the basis of evidence from "victims"
without effective appeal |
| Denial of evidence and repudiation of witnesses (incl. assassination
of witnesses) |
Denial of evidence for alternative explanations and repudiation
of witnesses by religious institutions representative of God |
| Secrecy: covert implementation |
Secrecy: unpredictable implementation |
| Sanction of moral authority: selective presentation of religious
citations |
Sanction of moral authority of religious institutions representative
of God (concerning the Wrath of God) |
| Exceptionalism: pattern of abuse framed as isolated
"mistakes" arising from regrettable actions of a particular individual
not respecting institutional policy |
Exceptionalism: pattern of calamities framed as
isolated incidents arising from regrettable actions of sinnful mankind not
then representative of God's Will |
| "Trial" by media and public opinion in advance of
(and undermining) any due process |
"Trial" by media and public opinion of declared
apostates in advance of (and undermining) any due process |
| Manipulation of definition of political terrorism to exclude
(or include) certain forms |
Manipulation of definition of terrorism to exclude (or include)
certain forms |
| |
|
This approach points to the possibility that a number of arguments presented
earlier as evidence against "God being a Terrorist" are problematic.
These include:
- "Natural causes": Restricting an "Act of God"
to acts of nature or natural causes and "without any interference by
humans whatsoever" precludes any possibility that God may act through
humans (possibly without their awareness), as many religions would vigorously
assert. As, the Creator of humans "in his image", the actions of
humans must partake in some measure of the quality of God -- whatever the
conclusion on the freedom of humans to act independently of the will of an
omnipotent, omnipresent God. For Doris Drisgil (The
Ultimate Terrorist): "Many believers will say that natural disasters
can't be blamed on God. Are they admitting that their God doesn't have full
control over everything that happens?". Debate continus to focus on whether
nature is good, evil, or morally neutral -- especially in the light of any
belief that the world (and nature) was created by an omnipotent God. The problem
of the evil in the world created by God has bedevilled theology down the ages
(see William B Drees. Is Nature Ever Evil? 2003) and produced a variety
of questionable solutions.These are the focus of theodicy
in demonstrating the existence and role of God without reference to supernatural
sources, and that the evil in the world does not conflict with the goodness
of God..
Given the increasing perception that "nature is dead" as a result
of human intervention in planetary ecosystems, it might be argued that many
natural disasters (such as flooding, etc) are indeed caused by humans through
nature as an intermediary. The point was made in 1997 on World
Disaster Reduction Day: "Some people believe that natural disasters,
including floods, cyclones, and drought , are "acts of God," but the recent
steep rise in losses due to natural disasters suggests a more worldly cause."
This perspective has been developed by UNEP (The State of the Environment:
Past, Present, Future? 2002) with the indication that that, while humans
for millenniums have feared "Acts of God" such as deluge and drought, they
now are vulnerable to much worse: "Acts of Man" played out through nature
[more].
In reporting on flooding, Martin Woollacott (Mozambique
flood disaster, Guardian, 3 March 2000) goes even further:
"Natural disasters used to be called acts of God because human beings
admitted no responsibility for such events, and made only limited efforts
to alleviate their consequences. But there has been a slow revolution in the
understanding of how men and women are complicit with nature in ways that
can magnify or minimise climatic and geological catastrophes." A major
article entitled "An
Unnatural Disaster" (Guardian, 8 January 2004) reports
on research indicating that global warming will result in the exticntion of
10 percent of plants and animals by 2050. The Save
Our Earth group asserts "There are no Acts of God, there are only
Acts of Man"
- Terror caused by God: It is abundantly clear that "Acts of God"
(as with the earthquake in killing some 30,000 people in Bam on 26 December
2003) are a cause of terror -- as is always their future possibility. People
of many religions fear the "Wrath of God". According to the definition
of the US Department of Defense, terrorism includes the use of the threat
of such violence "to inculcate fear". God would therefore appear
to be quite capable of acting violently as a terrorist, and having effects
on people's lives equivalent (in the most dramatic and horrific detail) to
those of a terrorist. Whilst God may indeed be a God of Love, he also has
the capacity detailed in the Bible to use his powers of destruction in ways
indistinguishable to the victims (or their relatives) from those of terrorism.
For Gianni Tibaldi:
It is the mysterious secretive dimension that establishes the truth nature
and power of "Terrorism" and constitutes its very special character
-- which may be usefully compared to the mysterious, undefined attributes
of "God". The more leaders, sources, bases, and support are hidden
and "shadowy" -- and its identity is unknown -- the more "Terrorism"
causes the spread of uncontrolled fear and destructive permanent effects.
As an "Act of God", an earthquake demonstrates the uncontrollable and unforeseeable
omnipotence of "God", signs of His implacable wrath, really increase
the effects of the terror because of the sense of guilt and powerlessness
of human people. An earthquake indeed becomes a very effective metaphor of
terrorism -- both as a terrifying act and as the evidence of implacable wrath
of a hidden, uncontrollable and unforeseeable power. This "deification" excites
a psychodynamic process of "transfer": the victims project the image of "God"
as mysterious, wrathful and punisher onto "Terrorism" and the terrorists
identify themselves with a "God" that is powerful -- because secret
and impossible to catch. Within this process the victims became more and more
vulnerable and the terrorists more and more possessed by a delirium of omnipotence.
It is interesting to note that as envisaged above, "Acts of God"
involve commission (in the form of natural disasters, etc) rather than
acts of omission (which may be less obviously disastrous). Thus Michael
Buerk, the BBC reporter (whose work in 1984 triggered Bob Geldorf's worldwide
Band Aid and Live Aid initiatives in response to massive starvation
in Ethiopia) noted in a follow-up report in 2004 that peasants there continue
to have faith each year that God will bring the rain (known as the "tears
of God") that will stave of further starvation. But he concludes that
they are regularly "betrayed by their God...who punishes them".
- "Predictability": From the perspective of the insurance
industry it is the unpredictability of "natural disasters" that
makes them problematic for actuaries in ensuring the economic viability of
an insurance policy -- hence their exclusion as "Acts of God". However
many such disasters are now more predictable scientifically (as with "bad
weather" for which insurance policies are available) -- and as are the
"social disasters" of war and terrorism that it is the business
of futurists and the intelligence community to render predictable. It is curious
that "Acts of God" are not at least extended to cover all disasters
not resulting from the predictable failure of "machinery" of any
kind.
- "Premeditation": This criterion is favoured in the definition
of terrorism of the US Department of State and would appear to be restricted
to human premeditation. However this would arbitrarily preclude consideration
of the implications of the omniscient quality of God who, for example, must
in some measure have "premeditated" the "Act of God" against
the civilians of Bam.
There is also the issue of actions that are experienced as terrorism by the
victims but which are consciously undertaken at God's command. This would
be the case with regard to the massacre of all the native inhabitants of the
Promised Land -- as commanded of Moses and Joshua by God: "Now go, attack
the Amalekites and totally destroy everything that belongs to them. Do not
spare them; put to death men and women, children and infants, cattle and sheep,
camels and donkeys." (1 Samuel 15.2) [see discussion by A.C.Nobes.
Massacre
of the innocents: Was the God of the Old Testament a brutal murderer?].
There is some question regarding the involvement of God in influencing President
McKinley regarding his instigation of the Philippine-American War (1899-1913)
at a cost of some 300,000 lives [more]
that parallels God's role in relation to influencing George Bush and Tony
Blair on Iraq with similar loss of life [more].
Presumably the deaths of the Filipinos could be similarly justified.
- "Political motivation": It might be assumed that God has
no political motivation according to the definitions of politics of political
scientists and politicians. It would however be difficult to challenge the
possibility that God has the functional equivalent of "political motivation"
-- especially in his efforts (recognized by many religions) to out-manoeuver
opposition to his policies by those of more malign intent. Again, in the light
of the US Department of Defense definition, the use of violence by God may
well be intended "to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological"
-- as demonstrated with respect to the Pharaoh of Egypt.
- "Illegality": The FBI definition of terrorism focuses on
the "unlawful use of force against persons or property". It would
be presumptuous indeed for the FBI to question the legality of God's use of
force given that it must be assumed (especially by a country so uniquely blessed
by God) that it was indeed God that created the laws of force and has long
freely used them against persons and property. Despite this, it may indeed
be the case that God does not restrict himself to action according to the
laws of the USA. Whether this suggests that God should change or that those
laws should be modified to reflect this is another matter.
- "Innocence": Some claim that a God of Love does not act
destructively against "innocents" but reserves his destructive wrath
for those meriting retribution. As demonstrated by John Norman (An
Effective and Reasonable Next Step in the War on Terrorism), this
argument is problematic in the light of the tenth, and final, calamity that
God inflicted upon the first born of Egypt. As noted above, Boaz Ganor argues
that: "'Innocent' (as opposed to 'civilian') is a subjective concept,
influenced by the definer’s viewpoint, and therefore must not be the basis
for a definition of terrorism. The use of the concept 'innocent' in defining
terrorism makes the definition meaningless and turns it into a tool in the
political game." Whilst this is a neat response to Norman's argument,
it does not respond to the fact that some of the "first born" of
Egypt must have been "civilians" rather than "military"
-- or even "military in non-military situations" (to allow for the
refinement in the definition of the Jewish
Agency for Israel). Given that "civilians" (favoured by Ganor)
and "noncombatants" (favoured by the US Department of State) were
not active concepts for the authors of the Bible, it may be assumed that either
might be substituted for "innocents" in a more modern translation.
But Ganor also argues that: "Individuals engaging in terrorist activities,
even if not wearing a uniform, exclude themselves from the civilian community,
and rules protecting civilians no longer apply to them." The question
here, again following Norman's exploration, is whether the first born (whether
"innocent" or "civilian") had all effectively "excluded
themselves from the civilian community" since, as some view the matter,
"all Egyptians shared in the guilt of this enslavement". But, for
Norman, "if we accept that, then we are bound to give credence to the
extreme view that there are no innocent Israelis, Americans, etc., thus making
them fair targets." As fair targets, they might well attract the retributive
attention of God -- as some Christian commentators declared following 9/11.
On the other hand, George Bush (in the light of his special relationship to
God as leader of the American people) has been able confidently to declare
that the regime in Iran is "evil". This suggests an interesting
parallel with the situation in Egypt, namely that God indeed used his retributive
powers on the civilians of Bam through the earthquake. As with the first born
of Egypt, these too must be considered as "evil". Any future major
earthquake in the USA, with equivalent loss of life, will be a real challenge
for the USA (and its Christian allies in the Coalition of the Willing), as
an indication of significant loss of favour with God (see also God's
Final Warning to America).
Reactions to 9/11 confirm that the status of "evil" has had considerable
impact on modern thinking as explored by Susan Neiman (Evil in Modern Thought,
2002) who notes that “The 1755 earthquake that destroyed the city of Lisbon,
and several thousand of its inhabitants, shook the Enlightenment all the way
to East Prussia.”. The reason was that philosophical thinking was at a turning
point. Natural events (though caused by supernatural actors), were now beginning
to be understood through scientific like investigations. "Evil" would
be restricted, in such thinking, to acts of human beings, not acts of God or
nature. Neiman takes “intellectual reactions to Lisbon and Auschwitz as central
poles of inquiry”, claiming that : “the problem of evil is the guiding force
of modern thought.”
Misrepresentation of "God" with respect to risk
management
It could be assumed that there are currently three distinct approaches to risk
management:
- investment in religion: This is the classical approach to the sense
of existential insecurity and any need for a truly comprehensive long-term
security. "God" is then regularly consulted like an insurance broker
-- both for short-term risks, life and after-life policies (of a longer-term
nature). This suggests a very particular approach to "God" and a
very particular understanding of the business that "God" is in.
- investment in policies obtained from the insurance industry: This
is the classical secular approach which is challenged in its comprehensiveness
by exceptional force majeure (including "Acts of God" and
"Acts of Terrorism"). Religious institutions (as discussed below)
themselves have extensive shareholdings in this approach to security, raising
questions about whether their own security is really comprehensive.
- investment in technology offering increased security: Although classical
in many respects, it is perhaps this approach which is perceived by the Christian-led
Coalition of the Willing as offering greater security than either of the above.
Exponential increases in surveillance systems, military hardware, and associated
equipment are in process of implementation. To the extent that they substitute
for the security offered by "God" they ironically emulate some of
the reported characteristics of "God". In the USA programs such
as Total Information Awareness
(TIA) aspire to emulate the omniscience of "God". The "Son
of Star Wars" antimissile shield effectively emulates an aspect of
the omnipotence of "God".
In the movie The
Man Who Sued God (2001), which inspired this paper, the defendants as
nominated (or self-acclaimed) representatives of God were forced to recognize
that their best defence against a multi-million dollar class action suit was
to deny the existence of "God" -- as defined by the insurance industry.
Clearly, here also, "God" cannot be a "terrorist" if he
does not exist. This is however equally embarrassing because then it raises
issues as to what business religion and the insurance industry are actually
in.
Is there indeed, as suggested in the film, a tacit "deal" between
religions and the insurance industry through which insurance gets to brand certain
disasters as being the sole responsibility of "God" (as a form of
placement advertising for religion and thereby ensuring immunity from legal
obligation), in exchange for the considerable investment made by religious institutions
in the multi-billion dollar insurance industry whose exposure to risk is thereby
reduced?
The insurance industry and contract law identify "Acts of God" as
a subcategory of "force majeure" -- as are "Acts of Terrorism".
Given a purportedly omnipotent God, would it not be more correct to consider
all forms of force majeure as "Acts of God"? Or is there some
implication that force majeure holds acts that are of "God"
as well as of some other entity (perhaps more strongly identified with "evil")?
Is there some sense in which some aspects of force majeure, such as "Acts
of Terrorism" may well be of greater (or equal) power to those of "God"?
Elsewhere it has been argued, in the light of George Bush's widely publicized
offering of a Thanksgiving "plastic turkey" to his troops in Baghdad
(28 November 2003) -- that increasingly modern civilization is effectively entering
a Plastic Turkey Era (Politicization
of Evidence in the Plastic Turkey Era, 2003). In line with those arguments,
it might then be asked whether the "God" that is thanked at Thanksgiving,
as defined by the leadership of the Coalition of the Willing, should also be
be recognized as a "plastic turkey".
Conceptual gerrymandering
As argued by Karen Armstrong (When
God goes to war, Guardian, 29 December 2003): "We can be
certain of one thing in 2004. Unless there is some unimaginable breakthrough,
we will see more religiously inspired terrorism."
The citations above are striking in their assertiveness with regard to understanding
of what is by definition beyond human understanding -- in the absence of conventional
forms of tangible evidence. In this light "religiously inspired terrorism"
could be interpreted to mean any form of "terrorism" inspired by evidence
that is available only to those with special interpretative insight, access
or convictions (see Groupthink:
the Search for Archaeoraptor as a Metaphoric Tale, 2002). There is then
a form of convergence between the traditional insights claimed and interpreted
by priesthoods (and devout believers) with those insights obtained by people
with unique access to "intelligence" (as claimed by the intelligence
community) and those, like George Bush and Tony Blair, who have privileged access
to it (whether assisted by insights from "God" or not). Like Bush
and Blair, many will follow the path of acting on their own private understanding
of what they profoundly believe "God" wishes. This parallels the behaviour
of the suicide bombers labelled as terrorists. In both cases, after "getting
out of bed" or "off their knees" (as exemplifed by President
William McKinley in the case of the American war on the Philippines), they can
claim to be following God's command.
The citations point to an appalling degree of definitional game-playing and
denial for a supposedly mature civilization. Conceptual boundaries are willfully
redrawn in different exercises of conceptual gerrymandering (see Conceptual
gerrymandering and definitional game-playing, 2002). The experience
of terror, and the perspective of the victim, is systematically ignored in any
approach to a definition (which might acknowledge how terror is otherwise induced).
The emphasis is placed on whether the terror is caused "legitimately"
in military action according to the conventions of war or "illegitimately"
by other forms of action. The fact that the former may cause as much destruction
and terror, or more, is ignored. The UK fire-bombing of cities (Dresden,
etc) and their civilian populations, and the USA destruction of cities and populations
(Hiroshima, Nagasaki), is considered "acceptable" in comparison with
the heinous, "evil" acts of modern "terrorists". Games are
played with "military" personnel as "legitimate" targets
of acceptable conflict (whatever the regrettable collateral damage) in comparison
with the "illegitimacy" of targeting the populations that support
them -- with special exceptions being made for "targeted killings"
of people who are defined (without due process) as having lost the right to
be treated as "civilians".
Wherever the definitions touch on the possible role of "God", boundaries
are carefully drawn -- through further conceptual gerrymandering -- in order
not to implicate "God". Although "God" is thoroughly implicated
wherever possible by the insurance industry. In concluding the case in the movie
The
Man Who Sued God (2001), the presiding judge notes that the collusion
between religions and insurance with regard to "Acts of God" constituted
an oppressive exploitation of policy holders that was "offensive to reason
and religion and most certainly wrong in law." The plea of the insurance
industry that the term "Act of God" was commonly understood as only
to be taken figuratively (as a legal fiction) was challenged. The case pointed
to the possibility that the insurance industry, with the connivance of religions,
was misrepresenting "God" and the nature of his actions -- and as
such exposed the insurance industry to sanction under the relevant articles
of any Trades Description Act regarding "misleading advertising".
Returning to the original question -- "Is God a terrorist from the perspective
of the Coalition of the Willing" -- it can be readily asserted that from
the perspective of those experiencing terror that it makes little difference
whether the terror is apparently free of human intervention (natural causes)
or directly caused by humans labelled as "terrorists" or "military"
personnel. Increasingly, from the perspective of the insurance industry, "Acts
of God" and "Acts of Terrorism" are equivalent.
If some at least of God's actions cannot be distinguished by the experiencer,
or by the insurance industry, from "Acts of Terrorism", then there
is surely a strong case for assuming that "God" is indeed a "terrorist"
from the perspective of the insurance industry at least. This is completely
unacceptable to most religious believers (despite Biblical supporting evidence),
who are then forced to engage in even more complex forms of conceptual gerrymandering
to focus solely on "God as Love" and to exclude any recognition of
the "Wrath of God" -- except where it is framed as "legitimate"
retribution against "evil" (for example, David Frum, Richard Perle.
An End
to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, 2003).
It is this logic which supports the "shoot to kill" policies of the
Christian-led occupying forces of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq -- on
the assumption that the person shot (whether a child or not) is necessarily
a legitimate "terrorist" suspect. Again for the experiencer, it is
completely irrelevant whether the shooting soldier is an instrument of the "God
of Love" or of "God the Terrorist". It is difficult to feel that
death is honourable when defined as collateral damage.
Clearly the insurance industry and contract law have done a major service to
humanity through their ability to define "Acts of God" so clearly
within an increasingly material world -- at a time when religions are increasingly
incapable of doing so meaningfully. At the same time religions will continue
to claim that because "God" is omnipresent, he is necessarily present
in every act and phenomenon, necessarily including both "Acts of
God" and "Acts of Terrorism" -- being omnipotent he is necessarily
the essence of force majeure in all of its forms. Thus, with the
assistance of the insurance industry, religions are placed in a position to
assert that "God" is indeed a "terrorist", but that it is
the Coalition of the Willing that is buying into a very simplistic understanding
of "God" and of "terrorism". It is effectively promoting
a lesser "God" accessible to human comprehension -- the "God"
of "You are either with US or against US" -- and "If the latter,
US will strike you down".
Conclusions
This argument raises questions about the nature of the "God" whose
blessing is repeatedly sought for the efforts of the Coalition of the Willing,
and notably by its leadership (see Sally McFague. Models of God, 1987).
Is it the (male) "God" that fundamentalists are so fearful may be
alienated by an apostate society -- evoking strikes against the unrighteous?
Is the "God" so understood to be considered as selective in his blessing?
Is he to be understood as cultivating favourites? Does he repeatedly need to
be reminded of his favourites' desperate need for such blessing -- or does he
believe that his blessings are ensured in such a continuous manner (through
a form of "broadband" access) that such requests are a symptom of
dysfunctional neediness?
At the core of any response to the question "Is God a terrorist"
is human ability to comprehend a "God" that can operate in two seemingly
incommensurable modes -- "loving" or "wrathful". Susan Neiman
(Evil in Modern Thought, 2002) highlights the contradictory nature of
"God" as being "good" (but sometimes allowing or doing "evil")
-- as all powerful (but allowing, even contributing to, human suffering).
In this connection it is intriguing to recall the statement by Jesus "I am
the Light of the world; he who follows Me will not walk in the darkness, but
will have the Light of life." (John 8:12). Science has drawn attention
to the duality inherent in the nature of light (as it is to be understood by
humans), namely the way in which light operates through either a "particle"
or a "wave" mode. Others have responded to the paradox of whether
Jesus was God or human by pointing to the dual nature of light and his use of
the light metaphor (Raymond Chiao. The
Quantum Wave of Faith, 2002). According to Michael J. Bozack (Conjugate
Properties and the Hypostatic Union, 1987) "God-man and the wave-particle
have properties which transcend either nature acting separately... Reconciliation
of the hypostatic union
and the wave-particle dualism is dependent on the role of human perception".
Use is also made of light as a metaphor in Islamic mysticism as indicated by
this verse of the Quran: "Allah (God) is the Light (soul) of the heavens and
earth." According to Wahid Bakhsh Rabbani (Islamic
Sufism): "Now, since God's being is pure light (Nur) and
since according to the cult of Wahdat-ul-Wujud (oneness of being), God's
Being penetrates everything in the universe including space, the building blocks
of the universe, which are nothing but God's Light which, on devolution, appeared
in the form of wave-like particles or particle-like waves... penetrating the
entire field of matter and space whose oneness has already been established
by both the scientists and the Sufis".
More intriguing however is the possibility that the metaphor is also of value
in pointing to the paradoxical duality between the "loving" and "wrathful"
dimensions that are apparently intrinsic to the nature of "God" --
who could then indeed be considered as a "terrorist" in one mode without
detracting from the "loving" nature of another. In the light of Heisenberg's
Uncertainity Principle, efforts at definition of the exact of nature of "God"
then only lead to uncertainity. A helpful discussion of this matter is provided
by Gene Poole (Benevolent
vs. Wrathful Deities: Understanding the Double Bind, 2000) in the light
of Vajrayana (Tibetan Buddhism).
Will the future see the processes of the current debate over the definition
of "terrorism" in the same scornful light as the frequently-told tale
of the scholastic preoccupation with determiing the number of angels that could
stand on a pinhead? [more
| more]
References
William B Drees (Ed.. Is Nature Ever Evil? Routledge, 2003
Boaz Ganor. Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom
Fighter? (text)
Anthony Judge:
Martin Kettle. How can religious peopke explain something like this? The
Guardan, 28 December 2004 [text]
Sally McFague. Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age. Philadelphia,
Fortress Press, 1987
Susan Neiman. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy.
Princeton University Press, 2002
Robert J. Russell . Theology and Science: Current Issues and Future Directions
(Agential Models of God’s Interaction With the World). 2000 (text)
Alex P Schmidt and Albert J Youngman. Political Terrorism. Amsterdam, SWIDOC,
1988
Michael Talbot. Mysticism and the New Physics. Arkana, 1993
Benjamin Watson. Acts of God. Random House, New York, 1993.
Brian Whitaker. The
definition of terrorism. Guardian, 7 May 2001
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